Socrates, the philosopher in the Theaetetus digression (172c-177c), and the ideal of homoiôsis theôi

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© 2011 Walter de Gruyter. Traditionally, scholars have taken homoiôsis theôi in the Theaetetus digression (172c-177c) to require neglect of particulars, but they have noted that although Socrates advocates it, he does not live such a life. To explain the discrepancy, Mahoney and Rue both argue that we need to reinterpret godlikeness to require active engagement in the city. I reject their reinterpretations and I revise the traditional view, arguing that godlikeness is not a single ideal. Instead, I argue, Plato provides several different portraits of godlikeness that together suggest interest in particulars makes the person neither better nor worse as a philosopher.

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