DIFFERENTIAL RISK-TAKING IMPLICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES FROM STOCK AND STOCK OPTION HOLDINGS
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-1-2019
Abstract
© 2019 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association We study the risk-taking implications of managerial pay-for-performance incentives (delta) arising from stock and stock options separately in the United States between 1992 and 2017. The current literature assumes that each unit of delta has an equal incentive effect on firm performance. Instead, we show that the risk-reducing effect of performance incentives is more pronounced for executives whose delta comes mostly from stock holdings relative to option holdings. Accordingly, we propose a new measure that takes into account the magnitude of delta from option holdings relative to delta from stock holdings (source ratio). Our results show that risk taking increases as this ratio increases.
Recommended Citation
Savaşer, Tanseli and Şişli-Ciamarra, Elif, "DIFFERENTIAL RISK-TAKING IMPLICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES FROM STOCK AND STOCK OPTION HOLDINGS" (2019). Stonehill Faculty Scholarship. 34.
https://soar.stonehill.edu/all_faculty_scholarship/34